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“Applications for the adduction of fresh evidence on appeal are not the sole preserve of an Appellant in the appeal; a Respondent may be granted leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal” The Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Court of Appeal that a parcel of land which the Appellant acquired through a lease did not form part of the vested land by the Stool Lands (Efutu and Gomoa Ajumako Instrument, 1961) (E.I 206). The Appellant was permitted to “adduce” (meaning, to present or offer) fresh evidence in the appeal. In reaction to this, the Respondent applied for authorization to also adduce fresh evidence to counter the Appellant’s fresh evidence. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 76 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I 16), all parties to an appeal may seek leave to adduce fresh evidence where it is in the interest of justice. In such instances, the Applicant must demonstrate that the evidence was not available at trial or could not have been obtained by the Applicant for use during the trial despite conducting reasonable due diligence. In addition to this, where the Appellant is permitted to adduce fresh evidence and the Respondent seeks to...

“There is a point of diversion between Redundancy occasioned under section 65(1) and 65(2) of Act 651: Redundancy under section 65(2) unlike under 65(1) mandatorily requires the employer to pay the employee Redundancy Pay”. The employment of two workers were terminated by the Appellant Bank. The Letters of Termination stated that significant changes had occurred in the demands or skills and competencies required for the delivery of the Bank’s objectives, and as such their employment was terminated. The Appellant Bank undertook to submit proposals for the negotiation of a Redundancy package with the labour representative of the affected employees. However, negotiations broke down due to the inaction of the Appellant Bank. A complaint was lodged at the Labour Commission (the “Respondent”). The Respondent determined that the Complainants should be paid Redundancy Pay. The Respondent subsequently applied to the High Court to enforce its decision. The High Court dismissed the application on the grounds that the ruling of the Respondent was not justified in law since the conditions precedent for Redundancy were not proven. The Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the appeal. The Appellant Bank appealed to the Supreme Court. One of the grounds of appeal was: that the Court of Appeal...

“This was an appeal from an application for stay of execution which was deemed refused by the Court of Appeal.” In the substantive case, Ogyeadom Obranu (“Respondent”) alleged that Ghana Telecommunication Ltd (“Applicant”) had encroached on his family land. At the end of the case brought before Agona Swedru the High Court, the trial judge granted the Respondent’s reliefs and awarded damages of USD 16,009,920.00 against the Applicant who appealed the decision. The Applicant also applied to the Court of Appeal for stay of execution of the judgment, after being refused at the High Court. The court granted the application on condition that the Applicant pays 30% of the judgment debt (GHS 21, 215,040.00), which it did. Unfortunately for the Applicant, the substantive appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The Applicant appealed to the Supreme Court from that decision and applied for stay of execution of the Court of Appeal’s judgement a day after. Though the application was granted by the Court of Appeal, the Applicant deemed it a refusal because of the terms given and repeated the application before the Supreme Court. The Respondent contended that since the Court of Appeal had simply dismissed the substantive appeal without more, there was...

“A mortgage shall have no legal effect until it is registered.” In 2007, the 2nd Defendant (the “Mortgagor”) mortgaged his property as collateral for a loan to the Appellant (the “Mortgagee”), on consent of the Lands Commission. Both parties failed to register the executed mortgage at the Lands Commission until 2010. Meanwhile, between 2008 and 2009, separate portions of the encumbered property were assigned respectively to the 1st Claimant and the 2nd Claimant (the “Claimants”). Subsequently, the Mortgagee obtained judgement against the Mortgagor for recovery of the loan and attached the property in question in satisfaction of the judgment. The Claimants filed their respective claims which resulted in interpleader proceedings initiated by the Sheriff of the High Court. The High Court held that the Claimants were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the encumbrance and discharged the properties from the attachment. The Mortgagee appealed to the Court of Appeal and same was dismissed. The Mortgagee further appealed to the Supreme Court, where the fundamental issue was restated as “whether or not the 1st and 2nd Claimants/Respondents in the circumstances of this case were bona fide purchasers for value without notice”. The Court held that in assessing whether a purchaser of land is a...